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Abstract: 
We use new data from SEC filings to investigate how S&P 500 firms execute their open 
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Their repurchase activity is followed by a positive and significant abnormal return which lasts 
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Stock repurchases have become an economically significant payout tool in the US. Little 
is, however, known about the manner in which the actual repurchase activity is related to 
market conditions and returns.
1  This is because in the past, firms generally reported only 
the aggregate number of shares repurchased over the quarter, without distinguishing 
between market and non-market transactions. Firms were also not required to report any 
information about the prices of their repurchase trades. As a result, publicly available 
information about repurchase activity in the open-market has been limited.
2
Following amendments to in SEC Rule 10b-18, which regulates stock buyback 
transactions, as of the beginning of 2004, US firms are required to report detailed 
information about their repurchase activity in their quarterly financial reports.
3 The 
requirements include reporting the number of shares repurchased per month, the nature of 
the repurchase (e.g., open market, tender offer, or privately negotiated transaction), the 
number of shares repurchased under a publicly announced plan, and the average price the 
firm paid for the shares during the reporting period on a monthly basis.  
In this paper we explore this new data source. We hand-collected information about 
actual repurchases of all S&P 500 firms from their 10Q and 10K filings for the years 

1 On the economic significance of actual repurchases, see, for example, Stephens and Weisbach (1998), 
Guay and Harford (2000), Fenn and Liang (2001), Grullon and Michaely (2002), Kahle (2002), Dittmar 
and Dittmar (2007), and Peyer and Vermaelen (2009). 
2 On the inaccuracy of pre-2004 publicly available repurchase data, see Cook, Krigman, and Leach (2003), 
and Banyi, Dyl, and Kahle (2008).  
3 SEC Rule 10b-18, which was adopted in 1982, provides a voluntary "safe harbor" from liability for 
manipulation, when an issuer or its affiliated purchaser bids for or purchases shares of the issuer's common 
stock, if they follow the rule's timing, price, and volume restrictions.  3
from 2004 to 2006, and investigate the manner in which firms repurchase their own 
shares in the open market. In particular we are interested in learning 1) how actual 
repurchase activity is related to liquidity, 2) whether firms purchase their shares at 
discounted prices relative to prices paid by other investors, and 3) how actual repurchase 
activity is related to past and future returns.  
We find that illiquidity, measured by the bid-ask spread, is lower in repurchase months 
(the spread is narrower). Specifically, 64% of the repurchasing firms have a narrower 
average spread in repurchase months relative to non-repurchase months. The average half 
bid-ask spread is 0.038% in non-repurchase months and 0.036% in repurchase months. 
While the difference is small, it equals approximately 5% of the spread and is statistically 
significant at the 1% level.
4 We also find clear evidence that only smaller S&P 500 firms 
repurchase their shares at lower prices, compared to other investors. Specifically, we sort 
our sample into three equal-size groups by firm size.  While all S&P 500 firms are 
relatively large, average firm size in the small-firm group is ten times smaller than the 
average firm size in the large-firm group. The average monthly price that small firms pay 
for their stock is 0.416% below the average monthly market price, and the difference is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. However, for medium-sized and large firms, this 
difference is negligible and statistically insignificant. Small firms also tend to repurchase 
less frequently than large firms. On average, small firms repurchased in 47% of the 

4The absolute difference is small because the bid-ask spreads in the sample are small. This is in turn due to 
the decimalization of the quotes in the NYSE and NASDAQ exchanges that occurred in 2001, and because 
the sample comprises S&P 500 firms. Our estimation of the difference is also likely downward- biased 
because firms repurchase only on a subset of the trading days in each month, while we average the bid-ask 
spread over all the days of each month.  4
reported months while large firms repurchased in 69% of the months. Controlling for 
size, we find that lower bid-ask spread is associated with a repurchase price that is 
discounted more heavily, relative to the market price. This, in turn, suggests that the more 
liquid the market the better the firm's ability to buy at favorable prices, and that 
repurchasing firms consume liquidity rather than provide it. 
With respect to the relation between repurchase activity and return, we find that actual 
repurchase activity increases following poor stock price performance and this increase is 
sustained for up to two months. This result holds regardless of firm size. We also 
measure returns after the repurchase month, and find that for the small firms in our 
sample, actual repurchase activity is followed by a positive and significant abnormal 
return that lasts up to three months, indicating market timing.
5 For large firms, however, 
the abnormal return is negative and insignificant. In fact, we show that a short-term 
strategy that focuses on the actual repurchase activity of the small firms can earn a 
monthly abnormal return of 0.9%, which is significant at the 1% level. We did not find 
positive abnormal returns in longer-term horizons (we considered returns for up to two 
years following the repurchase). 
Our interpretation of the findings—that only small S&P 500 firms repurchase at 
discounted prices, have positive post-repurchase returns, and repurchase less 
frequently—is that small firms repurchase strategically whereas the repurchase activity of 

5 We identify "market timing" with repurchasing before price increases, and distinguish it from buying at 
prices lower than the average market prices within the month. We do so because we want to investigate the 
firm's ability to repurchase at cheap prices separately from the relation between the repurchase and the 
post-repurchase returns. The repurchase literature sometimes uses the term "market timing" for both.  5
large firms is more focused on disbursement of free cash. Specifically, two important 
properties of stock buybacks are the disbursement of free cash and the transfer of wealth 
among shareholders if the stock is not fairly priced. Given that smaller firms are 
associated with higher information asymmetry, their motivation to repurchase 
strategically in order to benefit from underpricing may be higher. At the same time, given 
that large firms tend to be mature, they are likely to have stronger motivation to disburse 
free cash regardless of mispricing. Consistent with this interpretation we find that the 
average dividend yield of large firms is 30% higher than that of small firms. This is 
because, in general, a larger dividend payout indicates stronger cash disbursement 
motivation.
It is possible that the smaller firms repurchase conditional on positive information, not in 
order to benefit from underpricing, but simply because they become privately informed 
of good information about the availability of free cash. The market receives the good 
information only when the financial reports are disclosed, and hence the discounted 
repurchase prices, and the positive correlation between actual repurchase activity and 
future abnormal returns.  
This study is not the first to consider the timing of actual repurchase activity and its 
relation to prices and liquidity. The most closely related studies include Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (2000), Brockman and Chung (2001), Cook, Krigman, and 
Leach (2004), McNally, Smith, and Barnes (2006), Ginglinger and Hamon (2007), and 
De Cesari, Espenlaub, Khurshed, and Simkovic (2009). Our novel contribution to the  6
existing literature is in showing that the association between repurchase activity, timing, 
and liquidity strongly depends on firm size. 
Cook, Krigman, and Leach (2004), (henceforth, CKL (2004)) investigate actual 
repurchases in the US before the regulation amendment, using repurchase data disclosed 
voluntarily by 64 firms during a one-year period ending March 1994. They find that the 
bid-ask spread is narrower on repurchase days and interpret these findings as evidence 
that repurchases contribute to market liquidity. Using US data, Brockman, Howe, and 
Mortal (2008) show that stock market liquidity increases the likelihood of a repurchase 
over dividends. Outside the US, De Ridder and Rasbrant (2009) report narrower spreads 
on repurchase days in Sweden. In contrast, Brockman and Chung (2001), and Ginglinger 
and Hamon (2007) study the relation between the bid-ask spread and actual repurchases 
in Hong Kong and France, respectively, and report wider bid-ask spreads on repurchase 
days (months) and suggest this indicates that actual repurchases reduce liquidity. 
With respect to repurchasing at discounted prices, CKL 2004 find that NYSE firms pay 
less than representative daily prices while NASDAQ firms pay more. While most of our 
findings are consistent with the findings in CKL (2004), we did not find any difference 
between NYSE firms and NASDAQ firms in terms of their ability to repurchase at 
favorable prices. This may be because we focus on S&P 500 firms, and hence our 
NASDAQ and NYSE firms are similar in size. Other studies also report that differences 
between NYSE and NASDAQ that existed in the 1990s disappeared in the 2000s, 
following changes in NASDAQ trading mechanisms. In a recent contemporaneous study,  7
De Cesari et al. (2009) also investigate actual repurchase activity in the US using post-
regulation-change data. Similarly to our study, they find that firms are able to repurchase 
at discounted prices. They focus on the impact of ownership structure, and show that a 
firm’s ability to repurchase at discounted prices is positively related to insider and 
institutional ownership at low levels of ownership, and negatively related to insider and 
institutional ownership at high levels of ownership. Their interpretation is that because 
insiders and institutions are better-informed investors, at low levels of ownership of these 
investors, their presence increases the incentive to repurchase based on information. 
However, at high levels of ownership of these informed investors, it becomes more 
difficult for the firm to benefit from information because competition with these informed 
investors in the financial markets is also more intensive. Brockman and Chung (2001) 
find that in Hong Kong firms repurchase at a lower cost than the cost that would result 
from a naïve accumulation strategy. McNally et al. (2006) show that firms in Canada are 
able to repurchase at prices that are a remarkable 5.5% lower than prices paid by other 
investors. 
Consistent with our findings, both CKL (2004) and De Cesari et al. (2009) also find that 
actual repurchase activity tends to increase following price drops, and interpret this result 
as evidence for "price support motivation." In Canada, Ikenberry et al. (2000), and 
McNally et al. (2006) also report negative returns before actual repurchase activity. 
Zhang (2005) reports negative returns in Hong Kong in the 20-day period before actual 
repurchases, and Ginglinger and Hamon (2007) document that firms in France also tend 
to repurchase after price drops. 8
The literature provides mixed evidence with respect to market timing of repurchase 
activity. CKL (2004) do not find abnormal returns following actual repurchase activity, 
but De Cesari et al. (2009) find positive abnormal returns consistent with our results. 
Outside the US, Zhang (2005) finds significant positive short-term abnormal returns 
following repurchase trade in Hong Kong, and Chung, Isakov, and Perignon (2007) 
report similar results in Switzerland. In Canada, Ikenberry et al. (2000), and McNally et 
al. (2006), also report price increases after repurchase activity, interpreting these findings 
as evidence of market timing. Ginglinger and Hamon (2007), however, find no 
significant price increases after actual repurchase activity in France. Given their findings 
that firms increase their repurchase activity following price drops, their interpretation is 
that, in France, firms repurchase for price support rather than as a result of market timing.
It is worthwhile to compare our findings on actual repurchases to findings about the 
announcement of open-market repurchase programs in the US. Announcements of 
repurchase programs and their impact on prices and liquidity have been studied 
extensively.
6 Announcements and actual repurchases, however, are different events. Most 
actual repurchase activity is spread over a period that lasts up to 3 years following the 
announcement, and announcing firms often repurchase much less or much more than the 
originally announced quantity (see Stephens and Weisbach 1998). In addition, most firms 
have several concurrent and overlapping announced programs (see Jagannathan and 
Stephens 2003). In fact, announcements merely reveal that the firm may be "in the 

6 See, for example, Vermaelen (1981), Comment and Jarell (1991), and more recently, Grullon and 
Michaely (2004).  9
market," and are often only marginally connected to actual repurchase activity. Studies of 
repurchase program announcements in the US provide mixed evidence about their impact 
on the bid-ask spread (Barclay and Smith 1988, Miller and McConnell 1995, Franz, Rau, 
and Thripathy 1995), suggesting dependency on information, while we find a narrowing 
of the bid-ask spread in actual repurchase months, suggesting a relation to liquidity. Oded 
(2009) shows that bid-ask spreads and program completion rates are negatively 
correlated, while Bonaime (2010) finds that program completion rates increased 
following the 2004 regulatory change.
Other studies of program announcements focus on long-run returns and find significant 
positive abnormal return in the years that follow the announcements (Ikenberry, et al. 
1995, 2000, and Peyer and Vermaelen 2009)
7. While our focus is the short term, 
specifically, one to three months before and after the repurchase, for comparison with this 
literature, we also considered longer horizons (up to two years following the actual 
repurchase). As mentioned earlier, unlike previous studies, we found no significant 
relation between actual repurchase and long-run returns. The difference in findings may 
be due to the fact that we measure abnormal returns relative to actual repurchase rather 
than relative to repurchase announcement, or because our sample is more recent. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the data and the 
methodology. Section II provides sample statistics and examines how repurchase activity 
is related to firm characteristics and liquidity. Section III analyzes the relation between 

7 Mitchel and Stafford (2000) however, report that long-run returns following repurchase announcements 
are positive and significant only on an equal-weighted basis but not on value-weighted basis.  10
repurchase price and market price. Section IV examines the relation between repurchase 
activity and past and future returns, and Section V concludes.
I. Data 
Our initial sample comprises 500 firms that were included in the S&P 500 in January 
2004. The sample period covers the 36 months between January 2004 and December 
2006. The repurchase data were obtained from filings to the SEC in 10Q and 10K forms, 
available on the SEC website (www.sec.gov). The data retrieved from these filings 
include the firm name, ticker, number of shares repurchased, and the average repurchase 
price during the month. Data on outstanding shares, prices, and returns were obtained 
from the CRSP. The data sets (obtained from the SEC and CRSP) were merged based on 
firm ticker. From the original sample of 500 firms, we eliminated firms that were delisted 
and therefore had no filings available on www.sec.gov.
8 We also eliminated firms with 
erroneous repurchase data and firms that could not be matched correctly with the CRSP 
data, resulting in 470 firms. Of these 470 firms, 416 reported repurchase activity in SEC 
filings during the sample period ("repurchase firms") while 54 firms reported no such 
activity ("non-repurchase firms"). 
In December 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted several 
amendments to Rule 10b-18 to enhance the transparency of actual repurchase activity. 
The amendments require disclosure in quarterly and annual reports all issuer repurchases 

8 Reports of delisted firms were not found in a standard search procedure of sec.gov and therefore these 
firms were not included in our study.  11
of equity securities in the last fiscal quarter. Thus, since 2004, this information is publicly 
available through the 10Q and 10K reports. Stock repurchase transactions are generally 
reported under the heading "Issuer Purchases of Equity Securities." For each month of the 
quarter, the firm reports: the total number of shares repurchased, the average repurchase 
price, the number of shares repurchased under a publicly announced repurchase program, 
and the number of shares remaining in its announced repurchase program at the end of 
the month. An example of actual repurchase reporting to the SEC is provided in 
Appendix A. 
For the 416 firms for which repurchase data were available in 10Q and 10K filings, 
several monthly observations were stated as repurchases at special prices not performed 
through the open market (such as tender offer repurchases, privately negotiated 
repurchases, and repurchases directly from managers). These monthly observations were 
eliminated from the sample.
9 Sixteen monthly observations were also removed after a 
review of the financial report revealed that they were accelerated stock repurchases 
transactions rather than open-market repurchases, even though they were reported under 
open-market transactions.
10 Price outliers were also removed using the following rule: If 
the average monthly repurchase price reported by the firm fell outside the daily high-low 
range during the month, the observation was removed (232 out-of-range monthly 
observations were removed under this rule).  

9 Under the new requirements of Rule 10b-18, a firm is required to briefly disclose in a footnote the nature 
of the repurchase transaction. We used these footnotes to eliminate from the sample those transactions that 
were not performed through the open market. 
10 Accelerated stock repurchase transactions were removed from the sample because they are performed in 
the open market over several months after they are reported.  12
The repurchase prices and quantities were adjusted for splits. Several firms did not have 
return data for all 36 months because they were delisted (for various reasons). We 
adjusted these firms' returns for the specific delisting month using CRSP delisting returns 
data.
11 The final sample consists of 16,526 monthly observations from 470 firms, of 
which 8,501 are non-zero repurchases. Out of the 470 firms in the final sample, 416 had 
at least one repurchase observation reported during the sample period. For these 416 
firms we have 14,669 observations (of which 8,501 are non-zero). 
II. Sample Statistics 
Table 1 reports general characteristics of the firms in the sample. Panel 1A provides 
statistics of the complete sample of 470 firms. In the table, Mean is the average of the 
firm-level averages, Median and Std are the median and standard deviation of the firm-
level averages, respectively. The mean (median) firm size is about $22.3 ($10.7) billion, 
and the mean (median) monthly dividend yield is 0.13% (0.11%). The mean (median) 
monthly return is positive at 1.11% (1.09%). The mean (median) monthly Alpha
abnormal return, measured using a 4-factor model which includes the three Fama-French 
(1993) factors and the Carhart (1997) momentum factor, is negative at -0.18% (-0.06%). 
The mean (median) monthly market volume is $2,671 ($1,489) million.  

11 Adjusting for delisting is important when comparing portfolio performance. Not including the delisted 
returns causes upward bias in the portfolio performance. For further discussion see Shumway (1997).  13
Panel 1B provides statistics of repurchasing vs. non-repurchasing firms. Of the 470 firms, 
416 (89%) had at least one month of repurchase activity whereas 54 (11%) had no 
repurchases reported in SEC filings during the sample period. The panel shows that the 
market capitalization of repurchasing firms is about two-times greater than that of non-
repurchasing firms, and that the difference is statistically significant.
12 Dividend Yield
and Alpha (abnormal return relative to four factors) are also significantly higher for 
repurchasing firms. However, Ret (naïve return) is not significantly higher for 
repurchasing firms and the difference in Market Volume is significantly higher for 
repurchasing firms only under the Wilcoxon measure. These findings are consistent with 
earlier documentations of repurchase activity in the literature.
13
Because we focus on S&P 500 firms, naturally most of the firms in the sample are NYSE 
rather than NASDAQ firms. Of the 470 firms in the sample, 398 (84.7%) are from NYSE 
and 72 (15.3%) are from NASDAQ.  
Table 2 reports statistics of repurchase activity. The characteristics are equally weighted 
across all 8,501 repurchase months of the 416 firms that had repurchase activity during 
the sample period. The average (median) amount spent on repurchasing shares, in a 
month in which the firm did repurchase, is $104 million ($27 million). The mean 
(median) market volume in repurchase months is $3,244 million ($1,725 million). In 
months with repurchase, monthly repurchase trade accounts for 3.3% of the monthly 
dollar volume of trade in the stock, and accounts for about 0.41% of the market 

12 The standard deviation of the market capitalization of non-repurchasing firms is high because of 
WalMart, with a market capitalization of $285 billion.
13On the tendency of repurchasing firms to also be dividend payers, see for example, Grullon and Michaely 
(2002). On the high abnormal returns on stocks of repurchasing firms, see for example, Peyer and 
Vermaelen (2009).  14
capitalization. The medians of the repurchase activity variables we consider tend to be 
low relative to their means, indicating positive skewness. The standard deviations of the 
variables tend to be high relative to their means.    
In Table 3 we investigate the relation between repurchase and liquidity. To do so, we 
include only firms that have both repurchase months and non-repurchase months. Of the 
416 firms with at least one month of repurchase activity, 22 repurchased in all months 
reported, and as a result, the analysis in Table 3 is based on 394 firms. The liquidity 
measure we consider is the half bid-ask spread (HBAS), calculated as the daily average of 
the half bid-ask spread over the month, based on CRSP daily closing bid and ask quotes. 
The volume of trade in dollars is also reported in the table (MktVol). Rows (1) to (6) 
report the results for the average values of HBAS in repurchase vs. non-repurchase 
months. The results show that HBAS is significantly lower in repurchase months relative 
to non-repurchase months. Specifically, the average half bid-ask spread is 0.038% in non-
repurchase months and 0.036% in repurchase months. The difference amounts to 
approximately 5% of the spread, and is statistically significant at the 1% level. As the 
table shows, MktVol is also higher in repurchase months relative to non-repurchase 
months. However, the difference is insignificant. 
Rows (7) to (10) of Table 3 report the results of a binomial test of the relation between 
repurchasing and liquidity. For each of the variables HBAS and MktVol, we counted the 
number of firms for which the difference in the average value of the variable in 
repurchase months less the average value in non-repurchase months is positive, and the  15
number of firms for which this difference is negative. As Table 3 demonstrates, there are 
253 firms (64%) for which average HBAS in repurchase months was lower than in non-
repurchase months (a negative difference in HBAS) but only 141 firms (36%) for which 
average HBAS in repurchase months was higher than in non-repurchase months (a 
positive difference in HBAS). There were 159 firms (40%) for which average MktVol in 
repurchase months was lower than in non-repurchase months (a negative difference in 
MktVol) and 235 firms (60%) for which the average MktVol in repurchase months was 
higher than in non-repurchase months (a positive difference in MktVol). As the bottom 
row of Table 3 indicates, the difference in the number of firms is statistically significant 
at the 1% level for both HBAS and MktVol (confirmed with a binomial distribution test 
under the assumption of equal chance for positive and negative outcomes). The results of 
this non-parametric test are thus consistent with the results reported for the t-stat values 
of HBAS and MktVol in repurchase months vs. non-repurchase months. Overall the 
results in Table 3 indicate that actual repurchase activity is negatively related to the bid-
ask spread, and positively related to market volume. Both findings suggest that 
repurchase activity is positively correlated with liquidity.  
In Table 4 we investigate whether repurchase characteristics depend on firm size. 
Specifically, we sort the 416 repurchasing firms into three equal-size groups by their 
average size (market capitalization) over the sample period. Panel 4A reports firm 
characteristics while Panel 4B reports payout characteristics of the different size groups. 
The bottom three rows in each panel report the difference between the large-firm group 
and the small-firm group, and the statistical significance of the difference using t-stat and  16
the Wilcoxon non-parametric test. Starting with Panel 4A, firm-size ranges are $0.5-$7.6 
billion in the small-firm group, $7.6-$18 billion in the medium-sized firm group, and 
$18-$357 billion in the large-firm group. Thus, while all S&P 500 firms are relatively 
large, the average firm size in the small-firm group is ten times smaller than the average 
firm size in the large-firm group. Panel 4A also reports firm characteristics across firm-
size groups. The average HBAS decreases from 0.046% in the small-firm group to 
0.028% in the large-firm group, and the difference is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. The negative correlation between firm size and HBAS is consistent with larger 
firms being more liquid. We also verified that the results about HBAS in Table 3 hold for 
each size group. That is, for each group the bid-ask spread is statistically larger in 
repurchase months than in non-repurchase months.
14 RetStd is the standard deviation of 
the return, and is naturally negatively correlated with size. Number of Analysts and 
Dispersion of Analysts are, respectively, the number of analysts covering the firm, and 
the dispersion of their quarterly earnings forecast, normalized by the forecast mean, and 
calculated based on monthly updates of forecasts from IBES. Naturally, larger firms have 
more coverage because they attract greater investor interest, and show less dispersion in 
analyst forecasts due to lower information asymmetry. 
Focusing on payout characteristics in the different groups, in Panel 4B, we report average 
repurchase frequency (RepFreq) across firm groups, where for each firm, RepFreq is the 
ratio between the number of months in which the firm reported a positive repurchase 
value and the total number of months in which the firm appears in the sample. As Panel 

14 The difference in HBAS between repurchase months and non-repurchase months also decreases with size 
across the groups. However, this decrease is not statistically significant.   17
4B indicates, larger firms repurchase more frequently: Repurchase frequency in the 
small-firms group is 47% and 69% in the large-firm group. Repurchase dollar volume 
relative to market dollar volume (ReptoMktVol) is similar in all groups: 3.7%, 3.0%, and 
3.3% for small, medium-sized and large firms, respectively. In sum, the results indicate 
that repurchase frequency is positively correlated with firm size. However, in repurchase 
months, repurchase dollar value relative to market volume is similar across firm-size 
groups.
The variable Rep/Size is the monthly dollar value of a firm's repurchase as a percentage 
of the firm's preceding month market capitalization, namely, “the repurchase yield.” 
Dividend Yield is the monthly dividend yield represented as a percentage. As Panel 4B 
shows, Rep/Size is similar across firm-size groups (the small differences are not 
statistically significant). However, dividend yield increases with firm size. The average 
monthly dividend yield in the large-firm group is 21% greater than the dividend yield in 
the small-firm group (0.148% vs. 0.122%, respectively). The t-statistics of the difference 
in the dividend yield between the large-firm and small-firm groups is 1.86, and the 
Wilcoxon is 2.68. The difference in the Total Payout Yield, which is the sum of Rep/Size
and the Dividend Yield, is, however, insignificant. The last three columns of Panel 4B 
report the significance of payout across the size groups relative to earnings (ratio) rather 
than market value (yield). The findings for the payout ratios (repurchase, dividend and 
total payout) are similar to the findings for the yield, that is, while the difference in 
Dividend Payout Ratio between the large-firm group and the small-firm group is 
statistically significant, the differences in Repurchase Payout Ratio and Total Payout  18
Ratio are not. With the exception of ReptoMktVol and HBAS (Panel 4A), which are 
calculated based on 8,501 repurchase months, all variables in Table 4 are calculated 
based on the complete sample of 14,669 observations (repurchase and non-repurchase 
months).
III. Repurchase Price Analysis 
In this section we investigate whether firms repurchase their shares at prices below 
current market price. We expect that repurchasing at favorable prices would be a 
challenge for firms because of the requirements of SEC Rule 10b-18. Specifically, Rule 
10b-18 requires that the firm refrain from bidding up the price, that is, firms cannot post a 
buy-limit order that is higher than the current bid or the most recent independent trade 
(the higher of the two). Thus, if a firm tries to benefit from private information, it is at a 
disadvantage relative to other traders because its trading strategy is restricted.  
A. Average Repurchase Price Relative to Market Price 
We start by considering the naïve difference between the average monthly repurchase 
price and the average monthly market price. The average monthly repurchase price we 
obtained from the financial reports is adjusted for splits using the CRSP price adjustment 
factor. Following CKL (2004), we define our variable of interest, Diff (in %), for firm i in 
month t, as the month-average repurchase price paid by the firm (RepPrc) less the month-
average market price (MktPrc) divided by the average market price. Specifically, 
Diff = (RepPrc – MktPrc) / (MktPrc),  19
The month-average repurchase price, RepPrc, is from the firm's financial report and the 
month-average market price, MktPrc, is calculated as the value-weighted average of the 
CRSP daily close prices (adjusted for splits), based on daily trade volume.
15 A positive 
Diff means that the firm repurchased at a price higher than the market price on average, 
and a negative Diff means that the firm repurchased at a price lower than the market 
price, on average. In our analysis of Diff, we start with simple statistics, and then 
investigate the dependency of Diff on various explanatory variables. 
Table 5 reports averages and t-statistics of the Diff measure for the different firm-size 
groups considered in Table 4. The market price input for Diff is the market price from 
CRSP, value weighted within the month based on daily trade volume. In Column (1) the 
average Diff is reported equally weighted based on the Diff averages of the 416 
repurchasing firms, each firm's Diff average being calculated equally weighted over the 
firm's monthly differences. In Column (3) average Diff is reported equally weighted 
based on all 8,501 repurchase observations. For completeness we also report the results 
for the complete sample at the bottom of the table. 
The results indicate that only small firms repurchase their stock at prices lower than the 
market price. When Diff is calculated based on the 416 repurchasing firms, with firms 
being equally weighted (Column (1)), Diff is -0.416 in the small-firm group and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. However, in the medium-sized and large-firm 

15 Results using the average of the open and close prices or the average of the daily high and low prices, 
instead of close prices, are qualitatively similar.   20
groups Diff is merely -0.024 and -0.010, respectively, and statistically insignificant. The 
results are qualitatively similar when Diff is calculated equally weighted over 
observations rather than over firms (Column (3)).
16 These findings suggest that, on 
average, small S&P 500 firms buy at favorable prices, while large S&P 500 firms do not. 
B.  Determinants of the Difference between Repurchase Price and 
Market Price 
In this subsection we conduct a multivariate regression analysis of the difference between 
repurchase price and market price (of the Diff measure). We consider the following 
explanatory variables. LnSize is the natural log of the average market cap of the firm over 
repurchase months. HBAS(t-1) is the average of the daily average of the half bid-ask 
spread as a percentage, in the month before the repurchase month, calculated based on the 
daily bid and ask quotes from CRSP. RepFreq is the ratio between repurchase months to 
total number of months the firm has in the sample. RetStd(t-1) is the 1-month lag of the 
return standard deviation.
17 Rep/Size is the ratio between the monthly repurchase dollar 
value and the market capitalization of the firm in the previous month. ReptoMktVol is the 
ratio between the average monthly repurchase dollar value in the stock and the average 
monthly market dollar value of trade in the stock. 

16 The results are also qualitatively similar when calculated value is weighted by the dollar value of the 
repurchase rather than equally weighted.   
17We are interested in the manner in which Diff depends on the characteristics of the firm. Accordingly, for 
HBAS and RetStd we use the 1-month lags rather than contemporaneous variables in order to avoid the 
contemporaneous dependencies between these variables and Diff that could impact our results.  21
Table 6 provides results of regression analysis of Diff, the difference between average 
monthly repurchase price and average monthly market price. The analysis is based on 
8,501 repurchase observations. In the calculation of Diff, the monthly repurchase price is 
taken from the firm’s financial reports, and the monthly market price is the calculated 
value weighted by trade volume over the daily close market price from CRSP.  
Recall that according to the definition of Diff, the more negative Diff, the more favorable 
the price at which the firm repurchases. Accordingly, the more negative the coefficient of 
the control variable, the lower the price at which the firm is buying. The coefficient of 
LnSize is positive and significant in all regressions, suggesting that small firms 
repurchase shares at lower prices relative to large firms, consistent with our findings in 
Table 5. This result holds even when we control for liquidity using HBAS(t-1), the 1-
month lag of HBAS (see regression (2)). The coefficient of HBAS(t-1) is positive and 
significant after controlling for size in all regressions, suggesting that given size, the 
more liquid the market, the better the firm’s ability to buy at favorable prices. The 
coefficient of RepFreq, the ratio between repurchase months and total months, is positive 
and significant in all regressions, indicating that firms that repurchase frequently do not 
do so at favorable prices. The coefficient of RetStd(t-1), the 1-month lag of the standard 
deviation of the return, is insignificant, suggesting that the standard deviation of return is 
unrelated to a firm’s ability to repurchase at favorable prices. Lastly, the coefficients of 
Rep/Size, the ratio between the firm's monthly repurchase volume and market 
capitalization, and ReptoMktVol, the ratio between the monthly repurchase dollar value 
and the monthly market dollar volume, are both insignificant, suggesting that the amount  22
repurchased does not affect a firm’s ability to purchase at favorable prices, either when 
scaled by market cap, or when scaled by market volume of trade. In sum, the regression 
results in Table 6 support our interpretation of the results in Table 5 that smaller firms are 
more capable of buying at favorable prices within the month.  
C. Discussion of Findings about Repurchase Activity Characteristics 
We summarize the main findings in Sections II and III as follows: 
x Repurchase activity is positively correlated with liquidity (Table 3) 
x Small firms repurchase at relatively low frequency while large firms repurchase at 
relatively high frequency (Table 4) 
x Small firms repurchase at favorable prices within the month; large firms do not 
(Table 5 and Table 6). 
We suggest the following interpretation of these findings. Small firms repurchase 
strategically depending on market conditions and are therefore able to repurchase at 
favorable prices within the month and profit from mispricing. Because they repurchase 
strategically, their repurchases are infrequent. Large firms do not repurchase strategically 
depending on market conditions, but rather repurchase on a regular basis. They do not 
aim to buy at favorable prices, and are more focused on the execution of their repurchase 
programs. As a result, their purchases are frequent and executed at prices which are, on 
average, close to the average market price.   23
Why do small firms differ from large firms in their repurchase characteristics? It is 
possible that because information asymmetry about small firms is high, for small firms, 
repurchasing in order to benefit from information dominates repurchasing for free cash 
disbursement. Because their markets are less liquid, small firms' repurchase trade is also 
constrained, which further limits their repurchase activity and reduces their repurchase 
frequency. In contrast, information asymmetry about large firms is low, and therefore 
large firms are not motivated by benefits from information. Large firms also tend to be 
more mature, and hence their motivation to repurchase in order to disburse free cash is 
likely stronger. At the same time, large firms are relatively liquid so they need to worry 
less about the effect their repurchase activity might have on the repurchase price, and 
hence they can repurchase on a regular basis.
Because our study cannot indicate causality, we cannot state whether repurchases reduce 
the bid-ask spread or firms tend to repurchase when the bid-ask spread is low. Put 
differently, we cannot infer from the negative correlation found between repurchase 
volume and the bid-ask spread whether repurchasing firms consume liquidity or provide 
it. The findings in Table 6, indicating that the bid-ask spread after controlling for size is 
positive and significant in explaining Diff (a higher bid-ask spread means higher purchase 
prices relative to the market price), also suggest that repurchase trade consumes liquidity 
rather than provide it. This is because a liquidity consumer is adversely affected by the 
bid-ask spread, whereas a liquidity provider benefits from the bid-ask spread.
18 

18 McNally and Smith (2010), however, find that in Canada most repurchase orders are limit orders and 
hence suggest that repurchases provide liquidity. In the US, data on order type (limit or market) are not 
publicly available.   24
Lastly, the notion “benefit from underpricing” deserves further clarification. Because 
repurchase is a zero-sum game, it is always the case that some shareholders gain at the 
expense of others. More specifically, when the firm repurchases to benefit from 
underpricing it is the staying shareholders that gain at the expense of the selling 
shareholders. We assume that managers will side with the staying shareholders because 
their future compensation will be determined by the staying shareholders and because 
managers tend to be staying shareholders themselves. Accordingly, our focus is the 
wealth of the staying shareholders.
19
IV. Actual Repurchase and Stock Price Performance 
The results in Section III indicate that small firms are able to repurchase shares at 
favorable prices relative to monthly averages. The results do not tell us, however, what 
firms, if any, also benefit from this execution strategy in the post-repurchase period. For 
example, if large firms are better informed about their expected performance, they might 
be buying at less favorable prices in order to benefit from post-repurchase price 
appreciation. In this section we investigate the manner in which repurchase activity is 
related to past returns and future returns. For this purpose we conduct several tests, 
utilizing several regression and vector auto regression (VAR) models. We find that 
repurchase activity increases following price drops regardless of firm size. However, only 
the small firms in our sample realize positive and significant post-repurchase abnormal 

19 Whose value the firm is maximizing, the staying shareholders or the departing shareholders, is an open 
question in corporate finance (see Dybvig and Zender, 1991).  25
returns. These positive abnormal returns last up to three months. We did not find a 
significant relation between actual repurchase and longer return horizons (we investigated 
returns of up to two years following the actual repurchase). By constructing portfolios 
that are long small repurchasing firms and short non-repurchasing firms we show that 
these abnormal returns are also economically significant. We conclude that smaller S&P 
500 firms are able to both repurchase at favorable prices and gain from post-repurchase 
price appreciation.
A. Determinants of Monthly Repurchase Activity – Regression Analysis 
We investigate how current repurchase activity depends on past returns. In addition we 
consider the manner in which current repurchase activity depends on other factors such as 
the bid-ask spread and past repurchase activity. In the analysis, we utilize both Tobit and 
Probit models. The Tobit model (also known as “the censored model”) is used when the 
dependent variable is censored at some bound (in our case zero repurchase). In the Probit 
model the dependent variable assumes the value of 1 in months with non-zero repurchase 
value, and 0 otherwise. Estimating the Probit model allows us to study the probability of 
a repurchase. A detailed description of the Tobit and Probit procedures we use appears in 
Appendix B. 
Table 7 reports results for Tobit and Probit analysis of monthly share repurchase on past 
returns. We run several specifications. The dependent variable in all regressions is 
Rep/Size, the monthly fraction of shares repurchased, measured as the ratio between the 
dollar value of repurchase reported and the market capitalization of the firm. We use the  26
following notation for the independent variables. Ret is the repurchase-month return, and 
HBAS is the average half bid-ask spread in month t. HBAS (t-1) is the half bid-ask spread 
in the month preceding repurchase. The other lagged independent variables are named in 
a similar manner. In order to measure the change in the dependent variable resulting from 
a unit change in any independent variable, we need to estimate the variables’ marginal 
effects. This is because we are estimating non-linear models (Tobit and Probit as opposed 
to a standard OLS). The marginal effects are usually estimated at the mean of the 
explanatory variables. 
Panels 7A and 7B of Table 7 report the Tobit model and Probit model results, 
respectively. Both panels report the marginal effects of the independent variables (which 
are a function of the estimated parameters, and reflect their impact on the dependent 
variable). See Appendix B for the estimation of the marginal effects in the Tobit and 
Probit models. Starting with Panel 7A (Tobit model) the marginal effects of Ret and 
HBAS are negative and statistically significant when these variables are considered alone 
or together (regressions (1) through (3)). The marginal effect of HBAS(t-1) is, however, 
insignificant (regression (4)). The marginal effect of Rep/Size(t-1), the 1-month lagged 
fraction of shares repurchased is positive and significant (regressions (5) and 7)), and the 
marginal effect of Ret(t-1), the 1-month lagged return is negative and significant 
(regressions (6) and (7)). When we use three lags of Rep/Size and three lags of Ret
together in regression (8), the explanatory variables lagged Rep/Size in months t-1, t-3,  27
and lagged Ret in months t-1 and t-2 are significant.
20 HBAS and Ret are also significant 
when these variables are included (regressions (9) and (10)). The results of the Probit 
model (Panel 7B) are qualitatively similar. 
To gain a sense of the implied economic magnitude, consider the impact of a change in 
Ret(t-1) on the change in Rep/Size. Recall that the average Ret is 1.16% (See Table 1, 
Panel 1B), and consider, for example, specification (6) of Panel 7A (Tobit model). The 
coefficient of Ret(t-1) is -0.004. Thus, estimating the marginal effect at the average 
values, an increase of one standard deviation (6.46%) in Ret(t-1) to 7.62% will result in a 
decrease of -0.027% in Rep/Size from 0.233% to 0.206%, or a decrease of about 10% in 
Rep/Size. Overall the findings in Table 7 suggest that a decrease in the previous month 
return results in a positive and significant increase in repurchase activity. Moreover, note 
that earlier lags of return also impact Rep/Size. We will further investigate this dynamic 
relation in the next section using a vector auto regression model that includes both actual 
repurchases and returns as dependent variables (a bivariate VAR model). 
We also repeated the analysis for the different firm-size groups considered in Section III. 
There were no significant differences between the size groups. That is, repurchase 
activity increases following a price drop regardless of firm size. 
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20 Stephens and Weisbach (1998) find that current quarter repurchase is negatively related to past quarter 
return, consistent with our findings here. However, their findings concerning the relation between current 
quarter repurchase and past quarter repurchase are inconclusive.  28
Our interpretation of the results in Table 7 is that the more negative the return, the more 
the firm repurchases. Firms seem to respond to a price drop by increasing their 
repurchase activity starting from the month of the drop in price. This relation between 
negative return and repurchase activity fades after approximately three months.
21
Because firm characteristics such as market-to-book, leverage, cash, and dividend yield 
change very slowly we do not expect them to affect repurchase activity at the firm level 
on a monthly basis, and hence we did not include them in Table 7. Still, we have verified 
that our results at the cross-section of firms are consistent with the literature (e.g., 
Dittmar, 2000, Table 5). Specifically, following the Dittmar methodology, we find that at 
the cross-section of the 416 firms in our sample, repurchase activity declines with 
market-to-book, leverage, and dividend yield, and increases with cash flow.
B.  The Dynamic Relation between Repurchase and Return 
We next turn to investigate the dynamic relation between actual repurchase activity and 
return utilizing a bivariate vector auto regression (VAR) model. The main advantage of a 
VAR model over a standard regression model is the dynamic setup used to capture the 
evolution and interdependencies between the variables. Because repurchase data are 
censored (repurchase values can only be nonnegative) a Tobit-VAR model is more 
appropriate than an OLS-VAR model. Accordingly, our analysis utilizes a Tobit-VAR. 
The procedure is described in detail in Appendix B. 
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21 We also investigated the significance of turnover (market dollar volume/outstanding shares) in month t.
Turnover was significant in the Tobit model, consistent with our earlier results that actual repurchase 
activity is positively correlated with liquidity. In the Probit model turnover was insignificant.  29
The repurchase variable utilized in all the VAR models we consider is Rep/Size, the ratio 
between the repurchase dollar value in month t and the market capitalization of the 
previous month. We use two different measures for return: The first measure is Alpha, the 
monthly abnormal return, calculated using a 4-factor model that is based on the three 
Fama-French factors and the Carhart (1997) momentum factor. Alpha is calculated out of 
sample as in Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998). The second measure we use 
is Ret, the return in month t. Both Alpha and Ret are adjusted for delisting as in Shumway 
(1997).
We sort all our 416 repurchasing firms into three equal-size groups, based on the firms’ 
average market capitalization over the sample period. We denote the group with the 
smallest firm size as small firms, the middle group as medium-sized firms, and the group 
with the largest firms as large firms. For each group we then estimate a Tobit-VAR 
model, i.e., a VAR model in which the return equation (Alpha or alternatively, Ret) is 
estimated using an OLS model and the Rep/Size equation is estimated using a Tobit 
model. The models are estimated with three lags of Rep/Size and three lags of return 
(Alpha or alternatively, Ret). This is because our results in Section VI.A suggest that the 
mutual impact of repurchase and return lasts for up to three months.
22 After the model is 
estimated, we estimate the impulse response of Rep/Size to a shock in Alpha and a shock 
in Ret, and the impulse response of Alpha and Ret to a shock in Rep/Size. We focus 
primarily on Alpha but report our findings also for Ret.
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22 Indeed, we also considered VAR models that include six lags of Rep/Size and Ret. The results under 
these models were qualitatively similar to the results obtained with 3-lag VAR models.  30
Table 8 reports our findings for the smallest and largest groups (small firms and large 
firms, respectively). In Panel 8A we report the cumulative impulse response of Rep/Size
to negative shocks in Alpha and Ret. Columns (1) and (2) report the impulse response of 
Rep/Size to a negative one-standard-deviation shock in Alpha for the small-firm group 
and the large-firm group, respectively. For both small and large firms, the impulse is 
positive from the start and statistically significant. The cumulative magnitude is 
approximately the same for small firms and large firms (0.31% vs. 0.27%, respectively). 
Columns (3) and (4) of Panel 8A report the impulse response of Rep/Size to a negative 
one-standard-deviation shock in Ret for the small-firm group and the large-firm group, 
respectively. The response is statistically significant for both groups. The cumulative 
magnitude of the impulse response is four times greater for small firms than for large 
firms (0.12% vs. 0.03%, respectively).  
Figure 1 depicts the impulse response of repurchase to a shock in return for small firms 
and large firms, as reported in Panel 8A of Table 8. Graphs 1A and 1B depict the impulse 
response of Rep/Size to a negative one-standard-deviation shock in Alpha for the small-
firm group and the large-firm group reported in Columns (1) and (2) of Panel 8A, 
respectively. The middle line in the graphs is the impulse response and the top and 
bottom lines are 5% confidence intervals, calculated using a simulation of 100,000 draws 
(see Appendix B). Graphs 1C and 1D depict the impulse response of Rep/Size to a 
negative one-standard-deviation shock in Ret for the small-firm group and the large-firm  31
group reported in Columns (3) and (4) of Panel 8A, respectively. As the graphs show, the 
results for a shock in Ret are qualitatively similar to the results for a shock in Alpha.
In Panel 8B we report the cumulative impulse response of Alpha and Ret to a positive 
shock in Rep/Size. Columns (1) and (2) report the impulse response of Rep/Size to a 
positive one-standard-deviation shock in Alpha for the small-firm and large-firm groups, 
respectively. The results suggest that the response is positive only for the smaller firms. 
The positive response reaches 0.62% for small firms and is highly significant, with a t-
statistic of 2.07. For large firms the cumulative response is -0.12% and is not statistically 
significant. Columns (3) and (4) of Panel 8B report the impulse response of Ret to a 
positive one-standard-deviation shock in Rep/Size for the small-firm and large-firm 
groups, respectively. The response of Ret for small firms is at 0.69%. For large firms it 
becomes stable at only 0.07% and is not statistically significant. Overall, the results for 
Ret are qualitatively similar to the results for Alpha.
Figure 2 depicts the impulse response of return to a shock in repurchase for small firms 
vs. large firms, as reported in Panel 8B of Table 8. Graphs 2A and 2B depict the impulse 
response of Alpha to a positive one-standard-deviation shock in Rep/Size for the small-
firm group and the large-firm group reported in Columns (1) and (2) of Panel 8B, 
respectively. As the graphs show, the response is positive for small firms and about zero 
for large firms. The 5% confidence intervals indicate that the response of the small-firm 
group is positive even for the lower confidence interval, while the response of the large-
firm group is strongly negative. Graphs 2C and 2D depict the impulse response of Ret to  32
a one–standard-deviation shock in Rep/Size for the small-firm and the large-firm groups 
reported in Columns (3) and (4), respectively, of Panel 8B. As the graphs show, the 
response of Ret to a shock in Rep/Size is qualitatively similar to the response to a shock in 
Alpha.
The results of the VAR analysis suggest that negative returns stimulate higher repurchase 
activity for both small and large S&P 500 firms. However, repurchase activity results in 
positive subsequent returns only for smaller S&P 500 firms. These findings and our 
findings in Section III (that smaller S&P 500 firms repurchase at a discount relative to the 
average market price while larger S&P 500 firms do not) suggest that small firms 
repurchase strategically while large firms do not. Overall, our findings from the VAR 
analysis support the hypothesis that small firms repurchase to take advantage of superior 
information, while large firms repurchase regardless. This difference between small and 
large firms is evident in the relation between repurchase price and market price (Diff), in 
the frequency of repurchasing, and in the relation between repurchase and future returns.
C.  Economic Significance of Abnormal Post-Repurchase Returns 
To investigate the economic significance of the relation between actual repurchases and 
returns, we next form portfolios in which we buy firms that repurchase in the month and 
short firms that do not. We hold this position for various horizons. The portfolios are 
repurchase-value weighted using the variable Rep/Size for the firms that we buy, and  33
equally weighted for the firms that we short.
23 We then measure the average cumulative 
Alpha and return relative to the base amount invested (which is equal to the amount 
shorted).
Table 9 reports the performance of various repurchase portfolios. Panel 9A reports 
cumulative Alphas and returns of portfolios constructed for different horizons. The first 
row of the panel reports the average cumulative Alpha for the entire sample. In this row, 
Column (1) reports the average 1-month Alpha of portfolios that buy firms that 
repurchased in the previous month and short firms that did not, and hold the portfolio for 
one month. Column (2) of this row reports the average cumulative 2-month return of 
portfolios that are constructed in the same manner but are held for two months. 
Cumulative average Alphas for 3-month, 4-month, and 5-month portfolios are 
constructed in a similar manner and reported in Columns (3), (4), and (5), respectively. 
As the first row shows, the average 1-month portfolio Alpha is negative but insignificant. 
The cumulative Alpha is higher for the 2-month portfolio and peaks after three months, 
where it is positive at approximately 0.5% and significant at the 5% level. The average 
Alphas of the 4-month and 5-month portfolios are positive but insignificant.  
The second and third rows in Panel 9A report the average cumulative Alphas of portfolios 
constructed based on the small-size third of the firms and the large-size third of the firms 
in our sample, respectively (results for the medium-sized portfolio are not reported). Here 
we implement the long-short strategy for each size group separately. The results show 
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23 We value-weight by repurchase volume because if repurchase is related to future return, we want to give 
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that the positive average Alpha reported for the entire sample actually originates in the 
smaller firms, and that the Alphas for these firms are actually highest in the second month 
after the repurchase. The larger firms actually have negative but insignificant average 
Alphas. The lower section of Panel 9A reports average cumulative returns (rather than 
Alphas) in a similar manner. The results for the cumulative return are qualitatively similar 
to the results reported for Alpha in the upper section of the table. However, the results for 
the return are less significant. The average cumulative return on the 3-month portfolio of 
the small-firm group is significant only at the 10% level. 
The results in Panel 9A indicate that the highest average Alpha and return are earned by 
the smaller firms in the second month following the repurchase. One possible explanation 
for the delay in the price response to actual repurchase is that while firms report 
repurchase activity on a monthly basis (in the financial report), this information becomes 
public only at the time of the quarterly reporting. The report is released three months after 
the repurchase on average, and hence the delay.
Although we focus on the short term, we also constructed 12-month and 24-month 
portfolios (Columns (6) and (7), respectively) to compare our findings to earlier literature 
on long-run performance of repurchase-announcing firms, which finds positive and 
significant abnormal returns (e.g., Ikenberry et al. 1995 and Peyer and Vermaelen 2009). 
As the table shows, average 12-month and 24-month Alphas are insignificant for the  35
entire sample, and for the small-firm group and the large-firm group separately.
24 The 
difference between our findings and the findings in the above-mentioned literature on 
long-run abnormal returns may be due to the fact that we measure abnormal returns 
relative to actual repurchase while the literature considered above measures abnormal 
return relative to repurchase announcements. Alternatively, it is possible that our more 
recent sample accounts for this difference.  
In Panel 9B we investigate the magnitude of the gain of a strategy that focuses on the 
small-firm group in the second month after the repurchase, as the results in Panel 9A 
suggest this strategy is likely to yield the greatest possible gain. Specifically, at the 
beginning of month t+2, we form a portfolio that buys all firms that had a repurchase in 
month t, and shorts all other firms. The portfolio is held for one month. For example, at 
the beginning of March 2004 we buy all firms that reported a repurchase in January 2004, 
and short all other firms, and hold this portfolio until the end of March 2004. At the end 
of the month the portfolio is sold. Each month a portfolio is constructed and the average 
Alpha and return of these portfolios are calculated and reported. Column (1) in Panel 9B 
shows this strategy earns an Alpha of 0.916% per month, or 12% annually, which is 
higher and more significant than any other strategy considered in Panel 9A. This result 
confirms that the highest return is indeed earned by investing in small-size firms in the 
second month after the repurchase. Column (2) in Panel 9B reports the average monthly 
return on this strategy, which is also higher and more significant than the other monthly 
returns reported in Panel 9A.

24 Naïve returns are positive and significant for the 24-month portfolio in the complete sample and for the 
small-firms group, but do not reflect abnormal performance.  36
Overall the results reported in Table 9 indicate that a repurchase-based portfolio does 
earn a positive and significant abnormal return. A portfolio that buys repurchasing 
S&P500 firms and is held for three months earns an Alpha of 0.5% or about 2% annually. 
These findings are consistent with the results of the regression analysis in Subsection 
VI.B, which show that the relation between repurchase and return is most significant in 
month 3 after the repurchase.
25 Furthermore, a portfolio that focuses on smaller S&P500 
firms can earn significantly higher returns (12% annually).
V. Conclusion
We use new data from SEC filings to investigate how S&P 500 firms repurchase their 
own shares in the open market. We find that liquidity, measured by bid-ask spread, is 
higher in repurchase months (lower bid-ask spreads). This positive correlation between 
actual repurchase and liquidity is consistent with findings of other studies in the US and 
in contrast to findings outside the US. We find that small firms repurchase less frequently 
than large firms. In contrast to large firms, small firms repurchase their stock at a price 
which is significantly lower than the average market price. Although actual repurchase 
activity is negatively related to the previous month return regardless of firm size, it is 
followed by a positive abnormal return only for smaller S&P 500 firms. This positive 
abnormal return (4-factor alpha) lasts for up to three months after the repurchase. Our 
interpretation is that, because information asymmetry about small firms is high, small 

25We acknowledge that because the monthly purchases are disclosed only in the financial report, the 
strategy is not feasible for uninformed investors. It, however, helps us assess the relation between actual 
repurchase and return.   37
firms tend to repurchase strategically, whereas the repurchase activity of large firms is 
more focused on disbursement of free cash. While earlier literature reports positive and 
significant long-run abnormal returns following repurchase program announcements, we 
found no significant long-run abnormal returns following actual repurchases. 
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Appendix A
This Appendix contains an example of a report on actual repurchase filed with the SEC. The 
reporting firm is Disney (Ticker: DIS) and the reporting is extracted from the 10Q report to the 
SEC for the period ending on June 30, 2007. Report date is August 1, 2007. The complete report 
is available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1001039/000119312507168199/d10q.htm
PART II.  OTHER INFORMATION (continued) 
ITEM 2.  Unregistered Sales of Equity Securities and Use of Proceeds 
The following table provides information about Company purchases of equity securities that are registered by the Company pursuant to 
Section 12 of the Exchange Act during the quarter ended June 30, 2007:
  Period   
Total Number 
of Shares 
  Purchased 
(1)
Weighted Average 
Price Paid per Share   
Total Number of   
Shares Purchased as 
Part of Publicly 
Announced Plans or 
Programs  
Maximum Number of 
Shares that May Yet Be
Purchased Under the 
Plans or  Programs
 (2)
April 1, 2007 – April 30, 2007  24,856,354 34.80 24,755,700 86 million
May 1, 2007 – May 31, 2007  14,892,293     35.78     14,793,100     389 million
June 1, 2007 – June 30, 2007  16,108,541 34.44 15,985,800 374 million
                       
Total  55,857,188     34.96     55,534,600     374 million
                       
(1)  322,588 shares were purchased on the open market to provide shares to participants in the Walt Disney Investment Plan (WDIP) 
and Employee Stock Purchase Plan (ESPP). These purchases were not made pursuant to a publicly announced repurchase plan or 
program.  
(2)  Under a share repurchase program implemented effective June 10, 1998, the Company is authorized to repurchase shares of its 
common stock. On May 1, 2007, following share repurchases made through May 1, 2007, the Company’s Board of Directors 
increased the repurchase authorization to a total of 400 million shares as of that date. The repurchase program does not have an
expiration date.  

Appendix B - Empirical Methodology 
This Appendix includes a detailed description of the methods used in the paper. Section 1 describes the 
estimation of the covariance matrix in our panel data sample. Section 2 describes the estimation of the 
Tobit and Probit models including their marginal effects. Section 3 describes the estimation of the VAR 
(vector auto regression) models used in the paper, their impulse response functions, and the calculation of 
their confidence intervals.
1. Estimation of the Covariance Matrix 
Our sample is a panel data set of 416 firms, with monthly observations over the years 2004–2006. For 
most of the firms we have 36 monthly observations. Several firms have less than 36 observations due to 
delisting issues. In the estimation of the covariance matrix of the parameters, we “cluster” by firm and 
add monthly time dummy variables. For further information about these methods see Petersen (2009). 
We exploit the next M-L property to estimate the parameters' covariance matrix: 
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where H is the Hessian and g is the gradient. 
The variance of the parameters, in all of the models in the paper (specifically: OLS, Probit and Tobit), is 
estimated by  
T
-1 -1 ˆ Est.Var[ ]=[Hessian] Var[gradient][Hessian]
To take into account the autocorrelation in the firms’ residuals, we sum the Hessians and the gradients by 
firm using 
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where H is the Hessian and g is the gradient of the specific model. Taking into account that the 
expectation of the gradient is zero at optimization, the variance of the gradient is estimated as  
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Upon substitution, the asymptotic variance of the parameters with firm cluster is 
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2. Estimation of Tobit and Probit Models 
2.1 Estimation of the Tobit Model 
Step 1- Estimating the Model Parameters 
We estimate the repurchase equation using the Tobit model (Tables 7 and 8). The Tobit model (also 
known as “the censored model”) is used when the dependent variable is censored at some bound or 
bounds. The underlying assumption in this model is that there is a continuous variable behind the 
observed data and the econometrician does not see the “true” continuous variable in the censored area. In 
our repurchase data the bound is 0. In the months without repurchase we observe 0 and in months with 
repurchase we observe the repurchase (the underlying continuous variable). 
In several estimations we use time and firm dummy variables as controls to capture the within-firm 
variability. In these cases we still cluster the residual by firm, using the procedure described in Item 1 of 
this Appendix. Clustering reduces the t-statistics of the parameters in our estimations. 
Step 2 - Estimation of the Tobit Model Marginal Effects 
After estimating the parameters, we estimate the marginal effects to estimate the effect of the explanatory 
variables on the dependent variable. For the Tobit model, the marginal effects are estimated at the mean 
of the explanatory variables by 
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Because the marginal effects are a function of the estimated parameters, we estimate the variance of the 
marginal effects using the Delta method, which is a first-order Taylor expansion. The formula is 
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2.2 Estimation of the Probit Model Parameters and Marginal Effects 
After estimating the Tobit model, we proceed to estimate the probability for a repurchase using the Probit 
model (Table 7 Panel 7B). In the estimation of the Probit model, the dependent variable Rep/Size assumes 
the value of 1 in repurchase months and the value of 0 otherwise. As in the Tobit model, we use time and 
firm dummy variables as control variables in several cases, and cluster by firm. 
The marginal effects of the Probit model are estimated at the mean of the explanatory variables by 
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As in the Tobit model, the Delta method is used to estimate the variance of the marginal effect.   
3. Estimation of the Impulse Response of the VAR (Vector-Auto-Regression) 
Models
3.1 The VAR Equations and Parameter Estimation 
We estimate a bivariate VAR model. The dependent variables in the system are Ret and Rep/Size. In each 
equation of the system (one for Ret and one for Rep/Size) we include three lags of each dependent 
variable. The model equations are defined by the next system: 
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When constructing the VAR model, the contemporaneous relation between the dependent variables is 
basically in the covariance matrix of the residuals. Because contemporaneous causality cannot be inferred 
statistically, the economist must decide which dependent variable "causes" the other. This decision is 
independent of which impulse response is investigated. Given the results in Table 7, that repurchase 
activity tends to follow a negative shock to return, and that the contemporaneous relation with the return 
is negative, we assumed that the return triggers the repurchase (although it is also possible that 
repurchases impact the return, which is also suggested by our results). For robustness we constructed the 
model under the opposite assumption that the repurchase rather than the return drives the results. The 
impulse responses resulting under this alternative assumption are qualitatively similar. 
As discussed above, repurchase is a censored dependent variable. As using the OLS specification for the 
repurchase equation may yield inaccurate results, we estimate two versions of a bivariate VAR model. In 
the first version we estimate both Ret and Rep/Size in the OLS model. In this way we ignore the fact that 
Rep/Size is censored. In the second version Ret is estimated by the OLS model and Rep/Size is estimated 
by the Tobit model. We denote version one as OLS-VAR and version two as Tobit-VAR. The results are 
qualitatively similar. For brevity the results of the OLS-VAR are not reported in this paper.  
3.2 The Impulse Response Function Update 
After estimating the models we estimate the impulse response function by sequentially updating the 
equations, based on the shocks to the system (a shock of 1 std.) and the estimated parameters. The shocks 
are given by the Cholesky decomposition of the residuals' covariance matrix. For the Tobit-VAR model 
we update the Tobit equation using  c w  ) Vu u w X ˆˆ y( )    /x E E based on the information concerning the 
explanatory variable. If our model includes time and firm dummy variables, updating is performed 
without these dummy variables, because they are used exclusively as controls. In the updating procedure, 
the terms of the previous update are considered observed data rather than latent variables. Due to the 
nature of the repurchase variable, 0 or positive outcome, if the update outcome for rep/size is negative, it 
is set to 0. We did not encounter any such negative outcomes in the updates. 
3.3 Confidence Intervals for the Impulse Response Function 
The standard errors and confidence intervals of the impulse response are estimated by simulation (see 
Hamilton, 1994, pp. 336-337). We simulated 100,000 rounds. In each round we estimate the impulse 
response based on the draw of the new set of the parameters. The draw is based on the estimated 
parameters and their covariance matrix.  
To estimate the joint covariance matrix of the parameters from both equations of the VAR system, once 
again we use the M-L properties: 
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The partition of the covariance matrix of the parameters from each equation K is given by 
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The partition of the covariance matrix of the parameters between equations 1 and 2 is given by 
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These expressions allow us to estimate the entire covariance matrix of the equations’ parameters even if 
one model is an OLS model and the second is a non-linear model such as the Tobit model. 
In the OLS case (the usual VAR model) the estimation is straightforward and yields the familiar 
expression,
 6
1 (X'*X) , where 6 is the covariance matrix between the equations' residuals and X is 
the matrix of the explanatory variables. 
3.4 Technical Note about the Covariance Matrix with Time and Firm Dummy 
Variables
As mentioned above, in order to estimate the confidence intervals of the impulse response function, we 
must draw a new set of parameters using the parameters' covariance matrix. When 450 dummy variables 
are included, such a draw is technically impossible. To circumvent this problem, after calculating the 
clustered covariance matrix, we make a draw from the partial covariance matrix, which is the partition of 
the covariance matrix that includes only the updated variable parameters.  
Table 1: Sample Statistics of the 470 Firms in the Sample
Panel 1A reports the sample statistics of the complete sample of 470 firms. Mean is the average of the firm-level 
averages, Median is the median of the firm-level averages, and Std. is the standard deviation of the firm-level 
averages. Firm Size is the firm market capitalization, calculated as the outstanding shares multiplied by the CRSP 
price at the end of the previous month. Dividend Yield is the monthly dollar value of the firm's ordinary dividend 
(taken from CRSP) as a percentage of the firm's market capitalization in the previous month. Ret is the monthly 
stock return, and  Alpha is the monthly abnormal return calculated using a four-factor model that is based on the 
three Fama-French factors and the Carhart (1997) momentum factor, and is calculated out of sample following 
Brennan et al. (1998). The variables Ret and Alpha are adjusted for delisting following Shumway (1997). Market
Volume is the monthly market dollar volume of trade in the stock, calculated as the sum over the month of the 
stock’s daily market dollar volume. The daily market dollar volume, in turn, is calculated as the daily stock trade 
volume times the end of day price based on the CRSP data. 
Panel 1B provides statistics of repurchasing vs. non-repurchasing firms. Columns (1)-(3) report statistics only for the 
416 firms that reported repurchase transactions during the sample period 2004-2006, and Columns (4)-(6) report 
statistics for the remaining 54 firms that did not repurchase any shares during the sample period.  
Panel 1A: Sample Statistics – Complete Sample 
  470 firms  (full sample) 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Mean Median  Std 
Firm Size ($millions)  22,268 10,745  38,939 
Dividend Yield (monthly)  0.13% 0.11%  0.12% 
Ret (monthly)  1.11% 1.09%  1.48% 
Alpha (monthly)  -0.18% -0.06%  1.57% 
Market Volume ($millions)  2,671 1,489  3,765 
Panel 1B Sample Statistics – Repurchasing vs. Non-Repurchasing Firms
416 firms with 
repurchase transaction
54 firms with no 
repurchase transaction
Difference 
in means 
t-stat of 
difference in 
means 
Wilcoxon of 
difference in 
means 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Mean Median Std  Mean Median Std       
Size ($millions)  23,543 11,747 39,899 12,159 5,943  29,005 11,384  2.52  4.58 
Dividend Yield (monthly)  0.14% 0.12% 0.12% 0.10% 0.03% 0.13% 0.04%  1.97  2.74 
Ret (monthly)  1.16% 1.11% 1.27% 0.66% 0.98% 2.56% 0.50%  1.43  1.22 
Alpha (monthly)  -0.08% 0.00% 1.34% -0.95% -0.56% 2.67% 0.87%  2.33  3.16 
Market Volume ($millions)  2,753 1,555 3,749 2,053  967  3,865  700  1.31  3.18 
            
Table 2 - Statistics of Repurchase Activity for the 416 Repurchasing Firms
This table reports the statistics of the repurchase activity during the sample period, based on a total of 8,501 non-
zero monthly repurchase observations reported by the 416 firms that repurchased shares during the sample period. 
Repurchase Volume is the monthly dollar value repurchased, calculated as the monthly quantity of shares 
repurchased in the month multiplied by the monthly average repurchase price reported on the 10Q or 10K form. 
Market Volume Given Repurchase is market dollar volume of the trade in the stock in repurchase months calculated 
as the sum over the month of the stock’s daily market dollar volume. (The monthly volume in Table 2 is different 
from the monthly volume reported in Table 1 because here we consider repurchase months only, whereas Table 1 
includes all months independent of a repurchase). The daily market volume, in turn, is calculated as the daily stock 
trade volume times the end of day price based on the CRSP data. Repurchase/Market Volume is the repurchase 
dollar value as a percentage of the dollar volume of trade in the stock in the repurchase months. (This ratio is not 
Row 1 divided by Row 2 because the average of the ratio is not the ratio of the average). Rep/Size is the monthly 
dollar value of the firm’s repurchase as a percentage of the firm’s market capitalization in the previous month. Mean
is the average of the 8,501 observations, Median is the median of the 8,501 observations, and Std. is the standard 
deviation of the 8,501 observations. 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Mean Median Std 
Repurchase Volume ($millions)  104 27  251 
Market Volume Given Repurchase ($millions)  3,244 1,725  4,604 
Repurchase/Market Volume 3.3% 1.9%  4.6% 
Rep/Size  0.41% 0.22% 0.64% 
Table 3 – Liquidity Statistics of Repurchasing vs. Non-Repurchasing Months
This table reports liquidity statistics of the sample of repurchase months vs. non-repurchase months. For each firm 
we calculate the average of the characteristic in the repurchase months and in the non-repurchase months and then 
calculate the difference. HBAS is the half bid-ask spread as a percentage, calculated in each month as the average of 
the daily closing bid and ask quotes from CRSP. MktVol is the average monthly dollar volume of trade in the stock 
on the market in millions of dollars. We include only firms with repurchase months and non-repurchase data; Of the 
sample of 416 firms, 394 firms had both repurchase months and non-repurchase months. 
The table reports the averages of HBAS and MktVol for all months in Row (1), for repurchase months in Row (2), 
and for non-repurchase months in Row (3). The difference in the averages between repurchase months and non-
repurchase months and the statistical significance of the difference are also reported (calculated as a paired sample). 
The p-values and t-statistics are reported in Rows (5) and (6) of the table, respectively. Rows (7) to (10) report the 
results of a binomial test of the relation between repurchase and liquidity. For each of the variables, HBAS and 
MktVol we report the number of firms for which the difference between the average value of the variable in 
repurchase months less the average value of the variable in non-repurchase months is negative, and the number of 
firms for which this difference is positive. The statistical significance of the difference is confirmed with a binomial 
distribution test, assuming equal chances for positive and negative outcomes.  
HBAS MktVol 
(1) All Months  0.0372 2667.8 
(2) Repurchase Months  0.0363 2710.0 
(3) Non-Repurchase Months  0.0380 2625.6 
(4) Difference (3)-(2)  -0.0016 84.4400 
(5) p-value of Difference (3)-(2)  0.000 0.144 
(6) t-statistic of Difference (3)-(2)  -3.65 1.46 
(7) # Negative  253 (64%)  159 (40%) 
(8) #Positive  141 (36%)  235 (60%) 
(9) N 394 (100%)  394 (100%)
(10)  Binomial Tests – p-value  < 0.0001  < 0.0001 
Table 4: Repurchasing Firms’ Characteristics: Dependency on Firm Size 
This table reports the repurchasing firms’ characteristics and the dependency of these characteristics on firm size. 
We sort the 416 firms that had repurchase activity during the sample period into three equally sized groups by firm 
size. Firm size is the average market capitalization over the repurchase months for each firm, and market 
capitalization is calculated as the number outstanding shares times the CRSP price at the end of the previous month. 
Starting with Panel 4A, Firm Size Range is the range of firm sizes in the group. The small-firm group includes firms 
with market capitalization in the range $0.5-$7.6 billion. The medium-sized firm group includes firms with market 
capitalization in the range $7.6-$18 billion, and the large-firm group includes firms with market capitalization in the 
range $18-$357 billion.  Each of the reported variables is calculated equally weighted for each firm over monthly 
data, and then equally weighted over the firms in the group. Average Size is the average firm market capitalization in 
each group in $ billion. ReptoMktVol is the average repurchase dollar value as a percentage of the dollar volume of 
trade in the stock in the repurchase months in each group. HBAS is the half bid-ask spread as a percentage, 
calculated in each repurchase month as the average of the daily closing bid and ask quotes from CRSP. RetStd is the 
standard deviation of the return, calculated for each month as the standard deviation of the daily returns within the 
month. Number of Analysts and Dispersion of Analysts are, respectively, the number of analysts covering the firm, 
and the dispersion of their quarterly earnings forecast, normalized by the forecast mean, and calculated based on 
monthly updates of forecasts from IBES. Continuing in Panel 4B, RepFreq is the repurchase frequency measured as 
the ratio between the number of months in which the firm reported repurchase activity and the total number of 
months in which the firm appears in the sample. For example, if a firm has only 20 months of data in the sample 
period, and this firm repurchased in 10 out of these 20 months, the repurchase frequency is 50%. Rep/Size is the 
monthly dollar value of the firm’s repurchase as a percentage of the firm’s previous month market capitalization. 
Dividend Yield is the monthly dollar value of the firm's ordinary dividend (taken from CRSP) as a percentage of the 
firm's previous month market capitalization. Total Payout Yield is the sum of Repurchase/Size and Dividend Yield.
Repurchase Payout Ratio is the average of the firms' annual dollar value of repurchase (calculated from monthly 
data) as a percentage of the firms' annual earnings (data item #18, Income before Extraordinary Items from 
Compustat).  Dividend Payout Ratio and Total Payout Ratio are calculated similarly. With the exception of 
ReptoMktVol and HBAS (Panel 4A), which are calculated based on 8,501 repurchase months, all variables are 
calculated based on the complete sample of 14,669 observations (months with and without repurchase).  
Panel 4A Firm Characteristics: Dependency on Firm Size 
Firm Size Group  # of Firms 
in Size 
Group 
Firm Size 
Range
(billions)
Average
Size
(billions)
HBAS  Ret Std  Number of 
Analysts
Dispersion
of Analysts 
Small-Firm Group  139 $0.5-7.6  $4.5  0.046%  1.59%  11.80  0.16 
Medium-Sized Firm Group  138 $7.6-18  $12.2  0.034%  1.42%  14.49  0.08 
Large-Firm Group  139 $18-357  $54.9  0.028%  1.32%  19.06  0.08 
All Firms  416 $0.5-357  $23.9  0.036%  1.44%  15.09  0.11 
Difference Large less Small      50.3  -0.018%  -0.28%  7.26  -0.08 
t-stat of difference     10.26  7.37  4.85  9.34  2.00 
Wilcoxon of difference     14.39  9.07  4.22  8.13  4.04 
Panel 4B Payout Characteristics: Dependency on Firm Size 
Firm Size Group  # of Firms 
in Size 
Group 
Rep
Freq
ReptoMktVol Rep/Size Dividend   
Yield 
Total
Payout 
Yield 
Repurchase
Payout Ratio 
Dividend
Payout 
Ratio
Total
Payout 
Ratio
Small-Firm Group  139 47% 3.7%  0.249%  0.122%  0.371%  0.52  0.18 0.70 
Medium-Sized Firm Group  138 57% 3.0%  0.219%  0.142%  0.361%  0.49  0.33 0.82 
Large-Firm Group  139 69% 3.3%  0.231%  0.148%  0.379%  0.50  0.30 0.0 
All Firms  416 58% 3.3%  0.233%  0.137%  0.370%  0.50  0.27 0.77 
Difference Large less Small    0.22  -0.37%  -0.018%  0.026%  0.008%  -0.03 0.12  0.09 
t-stat of difference    6.73  1.21 0.75  1.86  0.35 0.44 3.07  1.34 
Wilcoxon of difference    6.37  0.65 0.32  2.68  0.42 0.55 3.57  1.46 
Table 5: The Difference between Repurchase Price and Market Price
This table reports averages and t-statistics of the Diff measure by firm size. This measure is defined as the average 
monthly price paid by the firm less the average monthly market price, divided by the average monthly market price 
(in %). The average monthly market price input for Diff is the value-weighted average of the CRSP end-of-day 
market price, weighted by the daily trade volume. The measure is winsorized around the 1% tails of its distribution. 
We partition the sample into equal-size groups by firm size: small firms, medium-sized firms, and large firms. The 
first row of the table reports the Diff measure for the small-firm group. In Column (1), Diff average is the equally 
weighted average of the group's Diff averages, each firm's Diff average being calculated equally weighted over the 
firm's monthly Diff observations. In Column (3), Diff average is the equally weighted average of the group's 
repurchase observations of Diff. The next rows report the results for the medium-sized firm group and large-firm 
group in a similar manner. We then report the significance of the difference between small-firm group and the large-
firm group. For completeness we also report the results for the complete sample (416 firms and 8,501 observations) 
at the bottom of the table. All t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated based on clustering by firm and time, 
following Petersen (2009, Eq. 16). 
Diff average based 
on 416 Firms’  Diff 
averages
Diff average based on 
8,501 Repurchase 
Observations
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
Diff average N Diff average N
Diff  by Firm Size      
Small-Firm Group  -0.416 139 -0.286  2,229 
[4.18]  [3.98] 
Medium-Sized Firm Group  -0.024 138  -0.05  2,762 
[0.38]  [0.93] 
Large-Firm Group  -0.010  139 -0.00 3,440 
[0.18]  [0.14] 
Small Firm less Large Firm Group: t-stat of Diff -3.61  -3.25 
Small Firms less Large Firm Group : Wilcoxon 
of Diff  -3.62  -4.85 
   
Diff  of Complete Sample  -0.149 416 -0.095 8,501 
[3.39]  [1.86] 
Table 6: Regression Analysis of the Difference between Repurchase Price and Market Price 
This table reports the results of the panel regression of the Diff measure on different explanatory variables. The 
analysis is based on 8,501 non-zero repurchase observations. Diff is defined as the average monthly price paid by the 
firm less the average monthly market price, divided by the average monthly market price (in %). The average 
monthly market price input for Diff is the value-weighted average of the CRSP end-of-day market price, weighted 
by the daily trade volume. The measure is winsorized around the 1% tails of its distribution. LnSize is the natural log 
of the firm's market capitalization, calculated as the outstanding number of  shares times the CRSP price at the end 
of the previous month.  HBAS is the half bid-ask spread as a percentage, calculated in each month as the average of 
the daily closing bid and ask quotes from CRSP. HBAS(t-1) is the 1-month lag of HBAS. RepFreq is the ratio 
between months with repurchase to total months that the firm appears in the sample. RetStd(t-1) is the 1-month lag 
of the standard deviation of the return, the standard deviation of the return being calculated for each month as the 
standard deviation of the daily returns within the month. Rep/Size is the ratio between the monthly repurchase dollar 
value and the firm's previous month's market capitalization. ReptoMktVol is the ratio between the monthly 
repurchase dollar value of trade in the stock and the monthly market dollar volume of trade in the stock. The t-
statistics (in parentheses) are calculated based on clustering by firm and time dummy variables. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Intercept -1.159 -1.569 -1.162 -1.586 -1.484 -1.457 -1.491
[3.65] [4.29] [3.66] [4.36] [3.98] [3.92] [4.04]
LnSize 0.098 0.123 0.072 0.097 0.095 0.092 0.096
[3.56] [4.12] [2.42] [3.04] [2.97] [2.87] [3.02]
HBAS(t-1) 3.987 4.150 4.225 4.129 4.263
[2.17] [2.25] [2.25] [2.21] [2.31]
RepFreq 0.335 0.347 0.324 0.318 0.325
[2.26] [2.36] [2.17] [2.13] [2.19]
RetStd(t-1) -0.07 -0.06 -0.069
[1.36] [1.22] [1.38]
Rep/Size 0.050 0.065
[1.06] [0.67]
ReptoMktvol 0.532 -0.238
[0.96] [0.21]
Adjusted - R
2 1.54% 1.65% 1.65% 1.77% 1.74% 1.73% 1.73%
Table 7: Determinants of Monthly Repurchases – Tobit and Probit Regression Results
This table reports the determinants of monthly repurchase activity using the Tobit and Probit models. The analysis is 
based on 14,669 observations (months with and without repurchases). Panel 7A presents the Tobit model results and 
Panel 7B presents the Probit model results. Both panels report the marginal effects of the estimation, estimated at the 
mean of the explanatory variables. The dependent variable is the monthly fraction of shares repurchased Rep/Size,
measured as the ratio between the repurchase dollar value in month t and the previous month market capitalization.  
Ret is the return in month t adjusted for delisting, following Shumway (1997). HBAS is the half bid-ask spread as a 
percentage, calculated in each month as the average of the daily closing bid and ask quotes from CRSP. HBAS(t-1)
is the 1-month lag of HBAS. Lags of the other variables are indicated in a similar manner. All regressions include 
time and firm dummy variables, and the t-statistics ( in parentheses) are clustered by firm. See Appendix B for the 
estimation of the models' marginal effects and calculation of their t-statistics.
Panel 7A: Marginal Effects of the Tobit Model 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Ret -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
[2.63] [2.77] [3.28] [3.57]
HBAS -0.513 -0.538 -0.764
[2.07] [2.18] [3.36]
HBAS(t-1) -0.113 -0.117
[0.33] [0.35]
Rep/Size(t-1) 0.124 0.123 0.116 0.116 0.116
[6.64] [6.72] [6.65] [6.65] [6.66]
Rep/Size(t-2) 0.014 0.014 0.014
[1.72] [1.74] [1.76]
Rep/Size(t-3) 0.056 0.057 0.057
[4.45] [4.49] [4.44]
Ret(t-1) -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
[6.29] [6.35] [6.68] [6.67] [7.03]
Ret(t-2) -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
[4.20] [4.34] [4.74]
Ret(t-3) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
[1.26] [1.50] [1.70]
Panel 7B: Marginal Effects of the Probit Model 
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )( 8 )( 9 ) ( 1 0 )
Ret -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004
[3.73] [4.17] [4.03] [4.65]
HBAS -1.032 -1.106 -1.354
[2.73] [2.87] [3.51]
HBAS(t-1) -0.821 -0.837
[2.20] [2.27]
Rep/Size(t-1) 0.161 0.160 0.153 0.153 0.152
[5.66] [5.79] [5.73] [5.73] [5.83]
Rep/Size(t-2) 0.019 0.020 0.020
[1.83] [1.88] [1.89]
Rep/Size(t-3) 0.082 0.083 0.083
[4.90] [4.97] [4.94]
Ret(t-1) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004
[3.95] [3.84] [3.91] [3.90] [4.50]
Ret(t-2) -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
[2.54] [2.71] [3.14]
Ret(t-3) 0.000 0.000 -0.001
[0.18] [0.50] [0.78]
Table 8: Impulse Responses of Repurchase and Return in Firm-Size Groups 
This table reports VAR (vector auto regression) analysis results. The analysis is based on 14,669 observations 
(months with and without repurchases). Panel 8A reports the cumulative impulse response of repurchase to a 
negative one-standard-deviation shock in return, controlling for firm size; Panel 8B reports the cumulative impulse 
response of return to a positive one-standard-deviation shock in repurchase, controlling for firm size. The repurchase 
variable considered in all models is Rep/size, the ratio between the repurchase dollar value in month t and the 
previous month market capitalization. We use two different measures for return: Alpha, the monthly abnormal 
return, calculated using a four-factor model that is based on the three Fama-French factors and the Carhart (1997) 
momentum factor (calculated out of sample, following Brennan et al., 1998) and Ret, the return in month t. The 
variables Alpha and Ret are adjusted for delisting, following Shumway (1997). We sort all 416 firms into three 
equal-size groups, based on the firms’ average market capitalization over the sample period: small firms, medium-
sized firms, and large firms. For each size group we then estimate a Tobit-VAR model, i.e., a VAR model in which 
the return equation (Ret or, alternatively, Alpha) is estimated using an OLS model and the Rep/Size equation is 
estimated using a Tobit model. The models are estimated with three lags of Rep/Size and three lags of return (Alpha 
or, alternatively, Ret). We report the results only for the small-firms and large-firms groups. In Panel 8A, Columns 
(1) and (2) report the impulse response of Rep/Size to a negative one-standard-deviation shock in Alpha for small 
firms and large firms, respectively, and Columns (3) and (4) report the impulse response of Rep/Size to a negative 
one-standard-deviation shock in Ret for small firms and large firms, respectively. In Panel 8B, Columns (1) and (2) 
report the impulse response of Alpha to a positive one-standard-deviation positive shock in Rep/Size for small firms 
and large firms, respectively, and Columns (3) and (4) report the impulse response of Ret to a positive one-standard-
deviation shock in Rep/Size for small firms and large firms, respectively. All VAR models include time and firm 
dummy variables, and the t-statistics of the impulse response function are adjusted for clustering. The t-statistics are 
reported at the bottom of the panels, and are calculated using a simulation of 100,000 draws. A detailed description 
of the VAR models and the simulation used appears in Appendix B.
Panel 8A - Cumulative Response of Rep/Size to Negative Shocks in Alpha and Ret
Rep/Size to Alpha Rep/Size to Ret
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 Period Small Firms Large Firms Small Firms Large Firms
t 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00%
t+1 0.16% 0.12% 0.06% 0.02%
t+2 0.18% 0.16% 0.09% 0.03%
t+3 0.27% 0.22% 0.11% 0.03%
t+4 0.29% 0.25% 0.11% 0.03%
t+5 0.30% 0.25% 0.12% 0.03%
t+6 0.30% 0.26% 0.12% 0.03%
t+7 0.30% 0.26% 0.12% 0.03%
t+8 0.31% 0.27% 0.12% 0.03%
t+9 0.31% 0.27% 0.12% 0.03%
t+10 0.31% 0.27% 0.12% 0.03%
t+11 0.31% 0.27% 0.12% 0.03%
t+12 0.31% 0.27% 0.12% 0.03%
t+13 0.31% 0.27% 0.12% 0.03%
t+14 0.31% 0.27% 0.12% 0.03%
t+15 0.31% 0.27% 0.12% 0.03%
Response T0-T15 0.306% 0.266% 0.117% 0.033%
t-statistic T0-T15 2.78 4.80 4.09 2.57
Panel 8B - Cumulative Response of Alpha and Ret to a Positive Shock in Rep/Size
Alpha to Rep/Size Ret to Rep/Size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 Period Small Firms Large Firms Small Firms Large Firms
t 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
t+1 -0.05% -0.15% -0.02% -0.14%
t+2 0.37% -0.31% 0.39% -0.25%
t+3 0.58% -0.15% 0.65% 0.01%
t+4 0.59% -0.13% 0.67% 0.05%
t+5 0.61% -0.13% 0.68% 0.05%
t+6 0.62% -0.13% 0.68% 0.06%
t+7 0.62% -0.13% 0.69% 0.07%
t+8 0.62% -0.13% 0.69% 0.07%
t+9 0.62% -0.12% 0.69% 0.07%
t+10 0.62% -0.12% 0.69% 0.07%
t+11 0.62% -0.12% 0.69% 0.07%
t+12 0.62% -0.12% 0.69% 0.07%
t+13 0.62% -0.12% 0.69% 0.07%
t+14 0.62% -0.12% 0.69% 0.07%
t+15 0.62% -0.12% 0.69% 0.07%
Response T0-T15 0.624% -0.124% 0.693% 0.075%
t-statistic T0-T15 2.07 -0.63 2.45 0.38
Table 9: Alphas and Returns based on Repurchase Portfolio 
This table reports the average Alpha and return on portfolios that are long repurchasing firms and short non-
repurchasing firms. Every month we construct a portfolio in which we buy all firms that repurchased in the previous 
month and short all firms that did not, and hold the position for different horizons. The portfolios are repurchase 
value weighed using the variable Rep/Size (measured as the ratio between the reported monthly repurchase volume 
in month t and the market value of the firm at the end of month t-1, calculated using CPSP) for the firms that we 
buy, and equally weighted for the firms that we short. Alpha is the monthly abnormal return, calculated using a four-
factor model that is based on the three Fama-French factors and the Carhart (1997) momentum factor, and where 
Alpha is calculated as out-of-sample alpha, following Brennan et al. (1998). Return is the return in month t. Return
and Alpha are adjusted for delisting, following Shumway (1997). Panel 9A reports the average cumulative Alpha
and return of portfolios formed for different horizons. The first row in Panel 9A reports average cumulative Alphas.
In this row, Column (1) reports the average Alpha of 1-month portfolios, i.e., the average monthly Alpha when each 
portfolio is constructed at the beginning of the month and sold at the end of the month. For example, at the 
beginning of February 2004 we buy all firms that reported a repurchase in January 2004, and short all other firms, 
and hold this portfolio until the end of February 2004. Column (2) reports the average 2-month Alphas of portfolios 
that are constructed each month and held for two months. For example, at the beginning of February 2004 we buy 
all firms that reported a repurchase in January 2004, and short all other firms, and hold this portfolio until the end of 
April 2004. Columns (3) to (7) are constructed in the same manner for horizons of 3, 4, 5, 12 and 24 months. We 
then partition the firms into three equal-size groups according to their average size over the sample period. The 
second and third rows in Panel 9A report the average cumulative Alphas for the small-size firms and the large-size 
firms, respectively (results for the medium-sized firms are not reported). The next part of Panel 9A reports average 
cumulative returns in a similar manner. The t-statistics in Panel 9A are in parentheses and are corrected for serial 
correlation in the residuals following Newey-West (1987). Panel 9B reports the average Alpha and return of the 
small-firm group firms in the sample, for portfolios that are constructed as follows. At the beginning of t+2 we buy 
all firms that had a repurchase during the month t, and short all other firms. The portfolio is held for one month and 
then sold. Each month a portfolio is constructed and the panel reports the average Alpha and return of these 
portfolios. For example, at the beginning of March 2004 we buy all firms that reported a repurchase in January 
2004, and short all other firms, and hold this portfolio until the end of March 2004. Column (1) of Panel 9B reports 
the average Alpha of these portfolios and Column (2) reports the average return of these portfolios.  
Panel 9A – Cumulative Alpha and Return of Repurchase Portfolios 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) N
Time period t+1 t+1 to t+2 t+1 to  t+3 t+1 to t+4 t+1 to t+5 t+1 to t+12 t+1 to t+24
Average Cumulative Alpha
All Firms -0.139 0.133 0.481 0.408 0.466 0.371 -0.427 416
[0.89] [0.64] [1.92] [1.14] [1.26] [0.45] [0.63]
Small-Firm Group 0.211 1.063 1.402 1.651 1.645 2.047 0.480 139
[0.84] [3.01] [3.57] [3.44] [2.77] [1.01] [0.28]
Large-Firm Group -0.279 -0.479 -0.268 -0.817 -0.832 -0.858 -1.891 139
[1.14] [1.16] [0.47] [1.03] [0.85] [0.40] [1.03]
Average Cumulative Return
All Firms -0.115 0.085 0.405 0.286 0.329 0.108 -1.899 416
[0.64] [0.40] [1.62] [0.83] [0.80] [0.17] [2.11]
Small-Firm Group 0.078 0.716 0.922 1.112 1.062 1.177 -2.008 139
[0.26] [1.77] [1.84] [1.77] [1.33] [0.73] [2.22]
Large-Firm Group -0.230 -0.421 -0.213 -0.894 -0.982 -1.222 -3.982 139
[0.97] [1.01] [0.36] [1.07] [0.94] [0.45] [1.24]
Panel 9B – Alpha and Return of a 1-month Repurchase Portfolio Using a 2-Month-Lag 
Investment in the Small-Firms Strategy 
Alpha Return
(1) (2) N
Time Period t+2  t+2
Small Firm Average 0.916 0.725 139
[2.84] [1.98]F
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